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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 I.  Introduction 
 On March 5, 1991, defendant William Marley III, a 
member of the Enterprise Fire Company, a volunteer fire company 
in the Borough of Hatboro, Pennsylvania, set fire to and 
destroyed plaintiff John D. Mark's automobile repair business.  
The question on this appeal is whether the Borough and Enterprise 
can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil 
rights statute, for damages resulting from the arson.  The 
district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, 
  
basing the decision on its finding that Enterprise was not a 
state actor for section 1983 purposes, and that it operates 
independently of the Borough.  We conclude that the district 
court erred in holding that Enterprise is not a state actor.  
Nonetheless, our review of the record compels the conclusion that 
the defendants cannot be held responsible under section 1983 for 
the harm that occurred.1  We, therefore, will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment. 
 
 II.  Factual background and procedural history 
 Enterprise is a private association of volunteers which 
has served the Borough of Hatboro since 1890.  Mark v. Borough of 
Hatboro, 856 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  In its day to 
day operations, Enterprise essentially acts autonomously; it owns 
the fire station and the fire fighting equipment, elects its own 
officers, prepares its own budget and maintains its own 
recruitment and training practices.  However, on September 28, 
1987, Enterprise signed an agreement with the Borough, agreeing 
to provide fire protection services to the Borough in return for 
the latter's imposition of a fire tax.  The Borough insures 
Enterprise's equipment, and the fire tax funds Enterprise's 
operations and expenditures.  Id. at 973-74.   
 According to Enterprise's by-laws (as of June 
16, 1989), "[a]ny person shall be eligible to 
                     
1
.  Of course, we can affirm on a ground on which the district 
court did not rely but which was raised before it.  See Neely v. 
Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 1988). 
  
be a regular member of the Company if they 
are eighteen (18) years of age or older and 
they are of good moral character."  
Enterprise Fire Company of Hatboro, 
Pennsylvania By-Laws at app. 59.  The by-laws 
provide the following procedure for admitting 
an applicant to membership:  (1)  An 
application for regular member [sic] must be 
made in writing on forms provided by 
[Enterprise].  The applicant must submit the 
completed form co-signed by a regular member 
in 'good standing' who shall be considered 
the 'proposing member'.  A fee of three 
($3.00) dollars shall accompany the 
application. 
 
 (2) The Membership Committee shall be in 
charge of membership and they shall be 
responsible for the production, distribution 
and receipt of completed application forms 
and fees. 
 
 (3)  Following the submission of the 
completed application and payment of the fee 
the Membership Committee shall arrange for 
the applicant and proposing member to attend 
the next regular membership meeting when both 
parties are available. 
 
 (4)  The applicant and proposing member shall 
appear at the regular membership meeting at 
which time the Membership Committee shall 
introduce the applicant to the regular 
membership.  The application shall then be 
referred to the Membership Committee for an 




 (5)  At the subsequent regular membership 
meeting the Membership Committee shall report 
on the application.  If a 'favorable report' 
is submitted than [sic] the regular 
membership shall vote to determine whether 
the applicant shall be accepted for 
'probationary membership.'  Said vote shall 
be made by the show of hands and three (3) or 
more negative votes shall be necessary to 
defeat the application . . . . 
 
By-laws at app. 59-60.  The application is a two-page 
questionnaire that asks, among other things, whether the 
applicant has "every [sic] been under the care of or committed to 
any institution for any nervous condition, mental illness, 
alcoholism or use of drugs."  App. 1-2. 
 Marley filled out and signed the application on May 9, 
1986, and answered "no" to the foregoing question.  Id.  On May 
19, 1986, Enterprise made him a probationary member, and it 
appears that in May, 1988 he became a regular member.  Id. at 1.2  
It is undisputed that prior to the Mark fire, Enterprise "never 
considered the need for psychological testing to identify 
firefighters having a propensity to commit arson. . . .  Neither 
did it receive any advice as to whether existing members or 
applicants for firefighter status could be identified as 
potential arsonists."  Brief of Enterprise Fire Company at 10.  
According to Mark's interpretation of expert reports, however,  
Marley had a psychologically troubled background which would have 
                     
2
.  The delay between Marley's probationary membership and 
regular membership apparently was due to the fact that Marley 
only turned 18 on May 3, 1988. 
  
indicated to trained observers that he was not fit to be a 
firefighter.  Additionally, while working as a volunteer 
firefighter, Marley had a serious drinking problem and, on one 
occasion, "was cautioned by other members to stay away from the 
fire officers at the scene [of a fire] because he smelled so 
strongly of alcohol."  Supplemental Statement of Dian Williams, 
President of Center for Arson Research, July 11, 1993 at app. 
946. 
 On December 23, 1992, Mark filed a complaint against 
the Borough, several Borough officials, and Enterprise in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to recover his losses from the fire.3  His complaint 
alleged that Enterprise's and the Borough's failure to follow 
adequate policies to ensure that applicants to the fire 
department were screened sufficiently for tendencies towards 
arson caused the damage to his property.4  Mark claimed that this 
duty to screen is compelled constitutionally, and that the danger 
of volunteer firefighters committing arson is so grave and so 
obvious that the defendants' failure to follow such a policy 
evinced willful disregard for the rights of individuals with whom 
the firefighters came in contact.  Mark further alleged that if 
                     
3
.  The complaint also stated common law tort claims against 
Marley but these claims are not before us on this appeal and we 
do not address them. 
4
.  Mark also claims that the defendants had a duty to perform 
periodic screenings of firefighters and to train firefighters to 
identify potential arsonists in the company.  We discuss all of 
these claims under the rubric of "failure to screen." 
  
Enterprise had a policy of psychologically screening applicants 
or of training its firemen to spot potential arsonists, it would 
have discovered that Marley was unfit to serve as a volunteer 
firefighter and it never would have admitted him into membership, 
so that Marley would not have started the fire.  Mark claimed 
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law.  The 
parties have considered the Borough officials on the same basis 
as the Borough itself, and consequently we shall treat this case 
as involving only two defendants, Enterprise and the Borough.5 
 On February 25, 1993, the Borough moved to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  On March 2, 
1993, Enterprise made a similar motion.  On April 8, 1993, the 
district court granted Enterprise's motion to dismiss counts 2 
and 3, which alleged, respectively, negligence and willful and 
wanton conduct, but the district court denied the remainder of 
the motions. 
 On December 28, 1993, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).  In their motion 
papers, they made a series of alternative arguments, including 
the following: (1) Enterprise was not a state actor for section 
1983 purposes, and therefore Mark had no federal cause of action; 
(2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no 
duty upon local governments to provide adequate fire protection 
                     
5
.  Mark did not specify whether he was suing the individual 
defendants in their official or individual capacities. 
  
or to protect the public from fire; (3) no local governmental 
entity has a due process duty to protect the public against 
violent acts of private persons; (4) even if Mark's 
constitutional rights were violated, he failed to demonstrate 
that the defendants' failure to screen applicants psychologically 
for membership evinced deliberate indifference; (5) the causal 
link between the failure to screen and the arson was too remote 
to support the imposition of liability. 
 In an opinion and order dated June 30, 1994, reported 
at 856 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the district court granted 
defendants' motion.  The court first addressed the state actor 
argument, and found that firefighting in Pennsylvania never has 
been an exclusive function of the government, and that there is 
an insufficient connection between the municipality and 
Enterprise to justify imposing state actor status on Enterprise. 
Id. at 970-76.  It went on to reason that "[s]ince [the Borough] 
has no control over [Enterprise's] employment practices in the 
first place, and since [Enterprise's] acts do not fairly 
represent official policy, the Borough's policy or lack of policy 
regarding [Enterprise's] screening of new applicants is not 
actionable under § 1983."  Id. at 976.  Upon dismissing the 
federal claims against both the Borough and Enterprise, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the district court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, 
and thus it dismissed those claims without prejudice.    
 Mark filed a timely notice of appeal from the district 
court's order.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
  
1291, as the appeal is from a final order disposing of all claims 
in the complaint.  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We exercise plenary review over 
the district court's grant of summary judgment.  Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1423 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Thus, "we must determine whether 'the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the moving party] 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"  Id. at 1423 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  As we recently described: 
 '[I]n applying this standard, "all inferences 
must be drawn against the movant, . . . and 
in favor of the nonmovant."'  [FDIC v. 
Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1994)] 
(quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. 
City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 
1988)). However, '"where the movant has 
produced evidence in support of its motion 
for summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot 
rest on the allegations of pleadings and must 
do more than create some metaphysical 
doubt."'  Id. (quoting [Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 
998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S.Ct. 554 (1993)]). 
 




 III.  Discussion 
 
 In cases involving the scope of liability under a 
federal statute, it always is appropriate to begin with the 
statutory language.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part 
that: 
  
 Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. 
 
"By its terms, of course, the statute creates no substantive 
rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights 
established elsewhere."  City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 
U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432 (1985) (plurality opinion).  
Thus, "[t]o establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a 
plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the 
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color 
of state law."  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Here, Mark claims that he was deprived of his substantive 
due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
district court opinion focused principally on whether Enterprise 
could be considered a state actor for section 1983 purposes.  
That is where, then, we will begin our analysis. 
 
  A.  Is Enterprise a State Actor? 
 "Although a private [party] may cause a deprivation of 
. . . a right, [it] may be subjected to liability under § 1983 
only when [it] does so under color of law."  Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733 (1978).  The 
  
Supreme Court has clarified that "[i]n cases under § 1983, 'under 
color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as 
the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."  
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 
1157 n.7 (1966) (quoted in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749 (1982) [hereinafter "Lugar"]), and 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769-70 
(1982).  The state action principle is stated succinctly as 
follows:  "[A]t base, 'constitutional standards are invoked only 
when it can be said that the [government] is responsible for the 
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'"  Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2089 
(1991) [hereinafter "Edmonson"] (O'Connor, J. dissenting) 
(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 
2785-86 (1982)) (alterations in original).  Put differently, 
deciding whether there has been state action requires an inquiry 
into whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action of [Enterprise] so that the 
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself."  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 
(internal citation omitted). 
 The Supreme Court in varying circumstances appears to 
utilize three discrete tests to determine whether there has been 
state action.  See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising 
Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993).  The first inquiry asks 
whether "the private entity has exercised powers that are 
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."  Blum v. 
  
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 (emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted).  Years ago, the Court applied this 
test somewhat liberally, holding, for example, that a town owned 
by a private company performs a public function and therefore is 
a state actor, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507, 66 S.Ct. 
276, 279 (1946), and that a private organization conducting pre-
primary elections for the purpose of sending its candidates to 
the primary election, engaged in an exclusive public function.  
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953).  See also 
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486 (1966) (public park 
could not be operated with racial restriction even when trustees 
had no connection to city government).   
 However, the Court came increasingly to emphasize the 
"exclusivity" aspect of the test, and rarely found that 
plaintiffs had met that rigorous standard.  Thus, in Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974), the 
Court held that a private utility company, extensively regulated 
by the state, and apparently holding at least a partial monopoly 
in its territory, did not act under color of state law, in part 
because the state where the utility was engaged in business had 
"rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services 
is either a state function or a municipal duty."  Id. at 353, 95 
S.Ct. at 454.  Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court 
held that a private entity engaged in the education of 
maladjusted high school students did not perform an exclusively 
public function because "[the state's] legislative policy choice 
[to fund the private school] in no way makes these services the 
  
exclusive province of the State."  457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. at 
2772; see also Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 
710-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (private contractor providing state school 
bus program at state expense not performing exclusive state 
function).  In sum, the exclusive public function test rarely 
could be satisfied. 
 The second discrete inquiry asks whether "the private 
party has acted with the help of or in concert with state 
officials."  McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Ed., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994).  Thus, in 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970), 
the Court held that a conspiracy between a private party and a 
state official to engage in unlawful discrimination constituted 
action "'under color' of law for purposes of the statute."  Id. 
at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1606.  Similarly, in Lugar a private party's 
prejudgment attachment of another party's property, pursuant to a 
state statute, constituted state action under section 1983.  
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42, 102 S.Ct. at 2756.  
 Finally, the third scenario involves situations in 
which "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence with . . . [the acting party] that it must be 
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."  
Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 
1984) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 
725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 862 (1961)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015, 105 
S.Ct. 2018 (1985) (alterations in original).  Burton was a 
  
classic application of this symbiotic relationship test.  There, 
the Court deemed a private restaurant's discriminatory act state 
action because the restaurant was located in a building owned by 
the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the state.  
Because of the arrangement between the Parking Authority and the 
restaurant, under which the State of Delaware benefitted 
financially from its lessee's business, the Court held that 
Delaware could be responsible for the restaurant's discriminatory 
acts.  Burton, 365 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct. at 862.  Following the 
reasoning in Burton, we have held that actions taken by the 
University of Pittsburgh and Temple University constitute state 
action because the universities "receive present financial 
support [and] the state has committed itself to future financial 
aid and sets an annual appropriation policy and tuition rate."  
Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 102.6 
 In Edmonson, the Supreme Court clarified the Lugar 
joint participation test and enunciated an approach that applies 
to this case.  In cases such as this, courts must ask "first 
whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the 
                     
6
.  The Supreme Court, interpreting the symbiotic relationship 
test, has commented that "while 'a multitude of relationships 
might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace,' 
differences in facts beget differences in law, limiting the 
actual holding [of] Burton to lessees of public property."  
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358, 95 S.Ct. at 457 (citation omitted).  At 
least one court has held that this language "limited the 
symbiotic relationship analysis."  Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 215.  
We, however, have held that the Burton test remains a viable 
framework for assessing state actor status.  See Krynicky v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d at 100-01; McKeesport Hospital 
ACGME, 24 F.3d at 526 n.1 (Becker, J., concurring in judgment). 
  
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state 
authority; and second, whether the private party charged with the 
deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor."  
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620, 111 S.Ct. at 2082-83 (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted).  In describing the second prong of 
the test, the Court explained as follows: 
 Our precedents establish that, in determining 
whether a particular action or course of 
conduct is governmental in character, it is 
relevant to examine the following:  the 
extent to which the actor relies on 
governmental assistance and benefits, see 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. 
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988); 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 
U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961); whether the 
actor is performing a traditional 
governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953); Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946); 
cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 
522, 544-45, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (1987); 
and whether the injury caused is aggravated 
in a unique way by the incidents of 
governmental authority, see Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). 
 
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22, 111 S.Ct. at 2083.7 
 Edmonson itself involved the question of whether 
peremptory challenges removing jurors in civil cases constituted 
                     
7
.  Edmonson inquires into whether the practice involved a 
"traditional public function" rather than an exclusive 
governmental function.  While, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in 
her dissenting opinion, the majority might have altered the 
traditional public function test as a discrete test, the Edmonson 
majority can be read to say that in conducting the joint 
participation discrete test, whether the private actor performed 
a traditional public function is one factor to consider.  But see 
Judge Greenberg's concurrence. 
  
state action under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  After 
weighing the relevant factors, the Court concluded (1) this was a 
situation in which "private parties make extensive use of state 
procedures with the 'overt, significant assistance of state 
officials.'"  Id. at 622, 111 S.Ct. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa 
Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486, 
108 S.Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988)); (2) peremptory challenges involve 
"[a] traditional function of government."  Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 
624, 111 S.Ct. at 2085; (3) allowing race discrimination to 
proceed with impunity in a courtroom "mars the integrity of the 
judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government 
from becoming a reality."  Edmonson, id. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 
2087.  Thus, the plaintiff's allegation that peremptory 
challenges were discriminatory could properly be considered under 
the Constitution. 
 We now consider whether Enterprise fairly can be found 
to be a state actor.  Courts addressing the status of volunteer 
fire companies in other jurisdictions have reached differing 
results.  See, e.g., Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire 
Co., 25 F.3d 1039 (table), 1994 WL 233356 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(question of whether fire fighting is traditionally exclusive 
government function in Maryland is question of fact); Haavistola, 
6 F.3d at 218 (same); Yeager, 980 F.2d at 340-43 (volunteer fire 
company in Texas not state actor); Janusaitis v. Middlebury 
Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1979) (volunteer 
fire department in Connecticut state actor); Versarge v. Township 
of Clinton, No. 90-257, 1991 WL 247611 at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 
  
1991) (act of expelling member from New Jersey volunteer fire 
company considered state action), aff'd on other grounds, 984 
F.2d 1359 (3d Cir. 1993); Kronmuller v. West End Fire Co., 123 
F.R.D. 170, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (disputed issues of fact existed 
about whether volunteer fire company was state actor); Libin v. 
Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Conn. 1985) (For 
establishment clause purposes, "[t]he near 'symbiotic 
relationship' between the Town and the Company requires the 
conclusion that the Company is, in fact, a state actor.").  Of 
course, since the question must be resolved by reference to the 
particular local facts, by definition none of these cases is 
controlling.   
 As noted above, the first question under Edmonson is 
whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the 
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state 
authority.  This prong of the test "only asks whether the private 
actor who caused the harm to another person was acting in 
conformity with the law of the jurisdiction when he caused the 
harm."  Rotunda & Nowak, § 16.1 at 527.  In other words, we ask, 
under what authority did the private person engage in the 
allegedly unlawful acts.  Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163, 92 S.Ct. 1965 (1972), provides a good illustration of how 
this first prong of the inquiry is applied.  In that case, a 
black plaintiff sued the Moose Lodge, a private fraternal 
organization, alleging that the Lodge's refusal to serve him 
alcoholic beverages violated his right to be free from racial 
discrimination under the Constitution.  The plaintiff "claimed 
  
that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued . . . Moose 
Lodge a private club license that authorized the sale of 
alcoholic beverages on its premises, the refusal of service to 
him was 'state action' for purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. at 165, 92 S.Ct. at 
1967.  The Court reasoned that because "the Pennsylvania Liquor 
Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or 
enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club that it 
licenses to serve liquor," id. at 175, 92 S.Ct. at 1972-73, there 
was no relationship between the relevant state policy and the 
discrimination.  Thus, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first 
prong of the test. 
 Here, however, the allegation of an unconstitutional 
deprivation is related directly to the Borough's agreement with 
Enterprise that the latter would be the official provider of fire 
services in the Borough.  Pennsylvania law authorizes boroughs 
"[t]o make regulations, within the borough, or within such limits 
thereof as may be deemed proper, relative to the cause and 
management of fires and the prevention thereof."  Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 53, § 46202(21).  Pursuant to this provision, on September 
28, 1987, the Borough entered into an agreement with Enterprise 
under which "[Enterprise] shall provide fire suppression and fire 
protection within the corporate limits of the Borough" and 
pursuant to which "[t]he [fire] chief shall be charged with the 
responsibility of providing fire suppression and fire protection 
and appropriate emergency assistance in accordance with 
[Enterprise's] training and expertise as required within the 
  
corporate limits of the Borough."  Agreement by Enterprise Fire 
Company to Provide Fire Protection for the Borough of Hatboro 
(hereinafter "Agreement"), at app. 169, 170.  Thus, the first 
prong of the test is satisfied. 
 The second question under Edmonson requires us to 
decide whether, all things considered, it is fair to hold that 
Enterprise is engaged in state action.   As noted above, one 
factor we consider is the extent to which the provision of fire 
services is a traditional public function in Pennsylvania.  In 
Jackson, the Supreme Court equated the question of whether 
something is a public function with the question of whether the 
particular state imposed a duty to perform the relevant function.  
Jackson, 419 U.S. 353, 95 S.Ct. at 454.  In that case, the Court 
refused to hold that providing utility services is state action 
under the public function test, because "while the Pennsylvania 
statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on regulated 
utilities it imposes no such obligation on the State.  The 
Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that furnishing 
of utility services is either a state function or a municipal 
duty."  Id. at 353, 95 S.Ct. at 454.   The question of whether 
there is a municipal duty to provide the services, and thus, 
whether fire protection is a governmental function, must be 
answered in light of "the history, tradition and local law 
surrounding volunteer fire departments."  Yeager v. City of 
McGregor, 980 F.2d at 340. 
 We conclude that in Pennsylvania, the provision of fire 
protection is a governmental function.  Pennsylvania courts 
  
repeatedly have recognized, notwithstanding the permissive 
language of the authorizing statute quoted above, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 53, § 46202(21), that volunteer fire companies are engaged 
in a public function and that municipalities have a public duty 
to provide fire protection.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
long ago said that "[t]he protection of the city from fire is a 
municipal function of the highest importance."  Commonwealth v. 
Barker, 61 A. 253, 254 (Pa. 1905).  In another case, the Court 
opined that volunteer firemen are analogous to police officers, 
and that volunteer fire companies were entitled to governmental 
immunity: 
 It has been held in this state that the duty 
of extinguishing fires, and saving property 
thereupon is a public duty, and the agent to 
whom such authority is delegated is a public 
agent, and not liable for the negligence of 
its employees. . . . The same reason which 
exempts the city from liability for the acts 
of its policemen, applies with equal force to 
the acts of the firemen.  And it would seem 
from this and other cases to make no 
difference, as respects to the legal 
liability, whether the organization 
performing such public service is a volunteer 
or not. 
 
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 556-57 (Pa. 1888) (emphasis 
added).  Relying on these cases, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania more recently concluded that "volunteer fire 
companies, because of their distinct creation and present 
relationship to municipalities, presently enjoy governmental 
immunity."  Zern v. Muldoon, 516 A.2d 799, 805 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
  
1986) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 541 A.2d 314 (Pa. 
1988)).  The court reasoned: 
 This conclusion is supported by a recognition 
that the functions and accomplishments of 
volunteer fire departments affix to their 
continued existence a public, governmental 
character.  The extensive statutory 
legislation which enhances and directs the 
organization of volunteer fire companies 
demonstrates an adoption by the Commonwealth 
and its citizenry of the governmental 
characteristic of volunteer fire companies.  
The charitable emphasis [of older cases] has 
been replaced by the critical realization of 
the need for continued public protection from 
fire and the realization that a governmental 
duty can be capably performed by mostly 
volunteer organizations. 
 
Zern, 516 A.2d at 805.  Even more recently, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, interpreting a Pennsylvania statute providing 
governmental immunity to governmental agencies, held that a 
volunteer fire company is a local agency entitled to governmental 
immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8541 (1982), and that 
"governmental immunity [applies] even when they are not engaged 
in fire-fighting activities."  Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 614 
A.2d 218, 219, 220 (Pa. 1992).8 
 Enterprise argues that Guinn is inapplicable because a 
holding that an entity is a governmental agency entitled to 
governmental immunity under a local law is fundamentally distinct 
                     
8
.  Guinn's holding has been interpreted to apply only to fire 
companies that "(1) have been created pursuant to relevant law 
and (2) that are legally recognized as the official fire company 
for a political subdivision."  Kniaz v. Benton Borough, 642 A.2d 
551, 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).  In this case there is no 
question that both of these requirements have been met. 
  
from a holding that a party is a state actor under section 1983.  
Indeed, in Krynicky, we noted the distinction between government 
agency status under state law and state actor status under 
section 1983.  Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 103 n.12.  But whether an 
entity is a state agency may, in certain cases, be relevant in 
determining whether it is a state actor for section 1983 
purposes.  Here, the rationale behind Guinn and the other cases 
discussed above was that in Pennsylvania firefighting is a public 
duty and a public function.  Thus, Guinn is certainly relevant to 
our analysis.9 
 Moreover, an analysis of Pennsylvania courts' treatment 
of volunteer fire companies in other situations leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that volunteer fire companies in Pennsylvania 
are state actors.  In Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. and Relief Ass'n 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d 439 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1983), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania discussed whether a 
volunteer fire company is an employer under Pennsylvania's Human 
Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43 §, 954(b) (1991).  In the 
course of its decision, the court discussed Janusaitis v. 
Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 464 F. Supp. 288 (D. Conn. 1979) 
                     
9
.  In Krynicky, we opined that "a state court construction of a 
state statute has no bearing on whether an entity that is 
connected with the state is a 'state actor' for purposes of the 
fourteenth amendment and § 1983."  742 F.2d at 103 n.12.  While 
it is certainly true that a state court's determination that an 
actor is private cannot bind a federal court's determination of 
whether the action is nonetheless public, a state's converse 




(Janusaitis I), and Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire 
Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (Janusaitis II), two opinions 
addressing whether a volunteer fire company is a state actor 
under section 1983.  In Janusaitis, the district court found that 
the company was not a state actor, but the court of appeals 
disagreed.  The Harmony court noted that "many of the 
considerations involved in the present case are also a part of a 
state action determination," see Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 
A.2d at 442-43, and rejected the reasoning of Janusaitis I.  
Instead, it quoted the court of appeals' statement that "[f]ire 
protection is a function public or governmental in nature . . . 
which would have to be performed by the Government but for the 
activities of volunteer fire departments."  Id. at 443 (quoting 
Janusaitis II, 607 F.2d at 24).  The Harmony court continued: "We 
concur with that statement and with the position of the 
commission that the fire company's primary function, the 
provision of fire and emergency services, is governmental in 
nature."  Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 443. 
 Our conclusion is reinforced further by a Pennsylvania 
appellate court's determination that a volunteer fire department 
may be held liable under section 1983 for violating a plaintiff's 
constitutional rights.  In that case, Tallon v. Liberty Hose Co. 
No. 1, 485 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the plaintiff alleged 
that a volunteer fire company "had denied her application for 
membership solely on the basis of her sex," id. at 1211, and 
claimed relief under section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
After the parties entered into a consent decree, the plaintiff 
  
moved for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.10  Upon 
finding that the company was unable to pay, the trial court 
declined to award fees.  The Superior Court reversed, holding 
that "an award of fees cannot be denied on the basis of 
appellee's perceived inability to pay," and remanded the matter 
for a determination of the proper amount of fees to be awarded. 
Id. at 1214. 
 Under section 1988, in a section 1983 case a plaintiff 
may receive an award of attorneys fees only if a prevailing 
party, and the Tallon court noted that "we agree[] that appellant 
met the requirements of the Act in that she was the prevailing 
party in a section 1983 cause of action."  Id. at 1212.  In order 
to prevail in a section 1983 cause of action, a party must 
establish that the defendant acted under color of state law, or 
was a state actor.  Therefore, in holding that the court could 
award attorneys fees, the Superior Court necessarily believed 
that the volunteer fire company was a state actor under section 
1983.  Otherwise, it could not have awarded fees. 
 Importantly, our conclusion cannot be avoided by the 
fact that Tallon involved interpretation of a consent decree, 
                     
10
.  This statute provides in pertinent part that: 
 
 In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part 
of the costs. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
  
because in that decree the defendant expressly contended that it 
violated no federal law.  See Tallon, 485 A.2d at 1211 (In the 
consent decree, "Liberty Hose made no admission that it had 
violated federal law."); id. at 1212 n.3 ("Appellee avers that 
appellant's claim against appellee did not involve any right 
guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 
therefore she cannot recover counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988.").  The court nonetheless found "this argument to be 
meritless."  Id. 
 Tallon is particularly significant because there, as 
here, the volunteer fire company operated with much autonomy.  
The consent decree provided that: 
 [A]ppellant would be admitted as a 
probationary member of the hose company, and 
if she fulfilled the probationary 
requirements, which applied to all members, 
she would be admitted as a permanent member.  
The consent decree further stated that the 
constitution and by-laws of the hose company 
would be amended to specify that no person 
would be rejected from membership on the 
basis of gender. 
 
Id. at 1211.  In other words, the company had its own by-laws, 
its own constitution, and the authority to adopt its own policies 
and regulations.  The case at hand is indistinguishable from that 
case.  We therefore hold that as Enterprise, in accordance with 
its agreement with the Borough, is "the duly appointed Fire 
Company to service the Borough" and under applicable state law is 
performing an exclusively governmental function.11 
                     
11
.  The district court also relied on several treatises for the 
proposition that firefighting generally, and in Pennsylvania in 
  
 Because Pennsylvania courts view firefighting as a 
public duty and treat volunteer fire companies for all relevant 
purposes as state entities, and because Enterprise is the duly 
appointed fire company of the Borough, we probably could end our 
analysis here.  We nonetheless continue to consider factors 
relevant to the question of whether Enterprise is engaged in 
state action.  We thus look at the extent to which Enterprise 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Edmonson, and 
the extent of the nexus between the state and the volunteer fire 
company.  McKeesport Hospital, 24 F.2d at 526 (Becker, J. 
(..continued) 
particular, historically has been the province of private actors.  
For instance, it states that "[i]n 1986, only 49 of the 
Commonwealth's 2,550 fire departments were paid or partially paid 
units.  The remaining 2,501 were all-volunteer fire companies."  
Mark, 856 F. Supp. at 973 (citing John Clements, Pennsylvania 
Facts at 23 (1987)).  In the first place, this fact does not 
answer the question of whether these private companies are 
performing a traditional governmental function, or whether a fire 
company duly appointed by a municipality is essentially an arm of 
the municipality.  Second, Pennsylvania courts' treatment of the 
issue is more significant than a single fact.  
  
 We are also aware that in Yeager, the court relied on 
several treatises and newspaper articles for the proposition that 
"there are a variety of private sector fire fighting 
alternatives; and fire fighting is not generally an exclusive 
government function."  Yeager, 980 F.2d at 341.  The problem with 
this analysis is threefold.  First, the Yeager court was supposed 
to be inquiring into the history of the particular municipality, 
not the general history of volunteer firefighting.  Second, the 
existence of private volunteer firefighting companies says 
nothing about whether the State or the municipality has a public 
duty to provide firefighting.  Finally, the Yeager court 
improperly applied the "exclusive public function" test.  When 
the question is whether the state can delegate a responsibility 
and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
is illogical to view the delegation of that very responsibility 
as evidence that the responsibility can be delegated.   
  
concurring in judgment).  We also consider the degree to which 
the State has "exercised coercive power or has provided . . . 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert."  Blum, 457 
U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786. 
 "[T]he history, structure, organization and public duty 
of volunteer fire companies distinguish them from any other 
organization in existence in this Commonwealth today."  Temple v. 
Milmont Fire Co., 525 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), appeal 
denied, 533 A.2d 95 (Pa. 1987); Scrima v. Swissvale Area 
Emergency Serv., 599 A.2d 301, 303 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) 
(distinguishing volunteer fire companies from volunteer ambulance 
associations, which only "provide an important service to the 
community").  One court has explained the intertwining of the 
state and volunteer fire companies in detail: 
  Numerous legislative enactments . . . 
interweave the functioning of the government 
and the fire company.  Several statutes 
provide the fire company with particular 
benefits and powers:  volunteer firefighters 
may become special fire police with full 
power to regulate traffic, control crowds and 
exercise all other police powers necessary to 
facilitate the fire company's work at a fire 
or any other emergency; volunteer fire 
associations are exempt from vehicle title 
and registration fees; and fire companies are 
eligible for low interest state loans in 
order to purchase equipment.  Other statutes 
also recognize the intimate relationship 
between a volunteer fire company and 
governmental entities:  the borough is liable 
for the negligent operation of equipment by a 
volunteer firefighter responding to an 
emergency; an employer may not terminate a 
volunteer firefighter for missing work while 
responding to a fire call; firefighters are 
government employees under the workmen's 
compensation act; firefighter relief 
  
associations are entitled to receive a two 
percent tax on all foreign fire insurance 
premiums; the borough may make regulations 
for fire safety and may make appropriations 
to fire companies; the state may regulate 
relief companies; and the fire station is 
exempt from property taxes. 
 
Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 443.  Moreover, 
Pennsylvania law prohibits municipalities from replacing 
volunteer fire companies by paid companies "except by a majority 
vote in a local referendum."  Temple, 525 A.2d at 851-52.  Its 
agreement with the Borough provides Enterprise with still more 
financial benefits.  Under it, "[t]he Borough agrees to provide 
[Enterprise] sufficient funds for its operation and capital 
expenditures by the imposition of a fire tax."  Agreement at app. 
169.  By using funds obtained by the fire tax, the Borough may 
purchase equipment or property for Enterprise, and Enterprise 
will keep its equipment and facilities in good repair.  Id. at 
170-71.  Further still, the Borough agrees to "maintain insurance 
for [Enterprise] as regards to personal injury or property damage 
from its general operating funds."  Id. at 171. 
 In exchange for taking over the municipality's public 
duty, Enterprise is designated as the "duly appointed Fire 
Company to service the Borough of Hatboro."  Agreement at app. 
170.  Enterprise must "prepare and submit an annual budget to 
Borough Council," which the Borough Council then decides whether 
or not to approve.  The agreement further requires the Fire Chief 
to attend meetings of the Borough Council and to "[p]rovide a 
written report to Borough Council at the first regular council or 
  
committee meeting of each calendar month as to the Company's 
current status relating to operations within the Borough."  And, 
directly pertinent to Mark's allegations of insufficient 
screening and training, "[t]he fire chief and president of 
[Enterprise] shall . . . [a]ssure that the operation of 
[Enterprise's] personnel and equipment meets satisfactory 
standards for fire prevention and control."  Agreement at app. 
172.  Finally, we note that the individual act alleged to be 
wrongful -- the method of electing firefighters -- is directly 
related to the state-created duty to provide fire protection in 
the first place.  See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007-08 & n.17, 102 S.Ct. 
at 2787 & n.17. 
 It is apparent, then, that the Borough and Enterprise 
are intertwined to a great extent, that Enterprise depends in 
large part on the municipality for funding, and that through the 
granting of benefits and the appointing of Enterprise as a "duly 
appointed fire company," the Borough actively encourages it to 
perform a municipal duty.  In the circumstances, we hold that 
Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of this case. 
 
 B.  Was Mark deprived of a constitutional right? 
 The fact that Enterprise is a state actor does not end 
our inquiry.  In order to prove a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff 
must show that he or she was deprived of a constitutional right.  
Mark bases his theory of liability against both defendants on 
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 
(1978), and later cases building on Monell, holding that a 
  
municipal entity may be liable when its policymakers made a 
deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a 
particular course of action, where the policy reflected 
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the 
municipality's inhabitants, and where the policy was the moving 
force behind a constitutional violation.  Mark further predicates 
his claim that there was a constitutional violation on the "state 
created danger theory," which, in turn, derives from language 
used in the Supreme Court opinion of DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989).  The 
defendants contend that under several cases decided after Monell, 
including DeShaney, Mark's claim must be dismissed. 
 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that "when execution 
of a government's policy or custom, whether by its lawmakers or 
by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent 
official policy, inflicts the injury then the government as an 
entity is responsible under § 1983."  436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 
at 2037-38.  Post-Monell cases often have reflected confusion 
with the actual standard governing the imposition of liability, 
but two subsequent Supreme Court cases have delineated those 
situations more clearly.  In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 
378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989), the Court held that "the 
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 
liability . . . where the failure to train amounts to deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come 
into contact."   In that case, however, the Court "assume[d] that 
respondent's constitutional right . . . was denied by city 
  
employees," id. at 389 n.8, 109 S.Ct. 1205 n.8, and went on to 
assess whether the failure to train ever could give rise to 
municipal responsibility.  Thus, the case cannot be read to stand 
for the proposition that a policy evincing willful disregard, 
though not causing a constitutional violation, can be the basis 
for section 1983 liability.  In short, City of Canton dealt with 
responsibility for an assumed constitutional violation.   
 In Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 
S.Ct. 1061 (1992), the Court clarified still further the issue of 
when a municipality may be liable.  In that case, the plaintiff's 
decedent, a city employee, died of asphyxia after entering a 
manhole.  The plaintiff claimed that her decedent "had a 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm 
to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to be 
protected from the City of Harker Heights' custom and policy of 
deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees."  Id. 
at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 1064.  The Court this time assumed that the 
municipality was responsible for the injury and asked whether the 
injury was of constitutional proportions.  Thus, it reversed its 
focus from that in City of Canton.  In so doing, it inquired 
into:  (1) whether "the Due Process Clause supports petitioner's 
claim that the governmental employer's duty to provide its 
employees with a safe working environment is a substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause," id. at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 
1069; and (2) whether "the city's alleged failure to train its 
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an 
omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or 
  
conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense."  Id. at ____, 
112 S.Ct. at 1070.  Reasoning that there was no affirmative 
constitutional duty, and that the city's actions were not 
conscience-shocking or arbitrary, a unanimous Court held that 
there could be no section 1983 liability.  It did not matter 
whether a policy enacted with deliberate indifference to city 
employees caused the injury, because the injury could not be 
characterized as constitutional in scope. 
 Thus, Collins made clear that in a Monell case, the 
"proper analysis requires us to separate two different issues 
when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality:  (1) 
whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional 
violation, and if so, (2) whether the city is responsible for 
that violation."  Id. at ____, 112 S.Ct. at 1066; see also 
Searles v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 791 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Collins). 
 Against this backdrop, we first address whether Mark 
can demonstrate that a constitutional injury was inflicted upon 
him.  He claims that the defendants directly caused the harm by 
creating the danger; in other words, he argues that "by cloaking 
Marley with state authority to set fires, Defendants prompted him 
to set fires he otherwise would not have set."  Reply Br. at 4 
(citing Complaint).  The defendants respond by characterizing the 
alleged constitutional violation as a failure to protect Mark 
from the risk of arson committed by private citizens.  They then 
argue that Collins and DeShaney foreclose Mark's theory of 
constitutional injury.  We turn to DeShaney now. 
  
 In the Supreme Court's own words, the facts of DeShaney 
were "undeniably tragic":  Although a Winnebago County Department 
of Social Services caseworker knew of a number of suspicious 
injuries to Joshua DeShaney, which strongly indicated that a 
member of the child's household was severely physically abusing 
him, the caseworker nonetheless took no action to protect the 
child.  Soon thereafter, the child's father "beat 4-year-old 
Joshua so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma 
[after which] he suffered brain damage so severe that he is 
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution 
for the profoundly retarded."  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193, 109 
S.Ct. at 1001-02.  Nevertheless the Court unequivocally held that 
states generally are under no affirmative duty to protect 
citizens from torts committed by private individuals.  The Court 
explained: 
 The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a 
limitation on the State's power to act, not 
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of 
safety and security.  It forbids the State 
itself to deprive individuals of life, 
liberty, or property without 'due process of 
law,' but its language cannot fairly be 
extended to impose an affirmative obligation 
on the State to ensure that those interests 
do not come to harm through other means. 
 
DeShaney, id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1003.  The Court held that no 
constitutional right had been violated because, absent a special 
relationship, "a State's failure to protect an individual against 
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the 
Due Process Clause."  DeShaney, id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004.  
There is a special relationship only in those limited 
  
circumstances where the plaintiff is essentially in the 
defendant's custody.  Thus, the Due Process Clause "requires the 
State to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated 
prisoners," who are unable to procure such care for themselves.  
DeShaney, id. at 198, 109 S.Ct. at 1005 (citing Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91 (1976)).  
Similarly, states must "provide involuntarily committed mental 
patients with such services as are necessary to ensure their 
'reasonable safety' from themselves and others."  Id. at 199, 109 
S.Ct. at 1005 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 
2452 (1982)).  See also Collins (state had no constitutional duty 
to protect employee from foreseeable risks at work); Searles v. 
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d at 792 (the Constitution 
"'[does not] impose[] a duty on SEPTA [, a passenger train line,] 
to provide a safe passenger environment.'" (quoting Searles v. 
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Civil Action Nos. 91-6687 & 92-
1065, 1992 WL 150701, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992)).   
 As a preliminary matter, we reject Mark's attempt to 
distinguish DeShaney by contending that Marley was a state actor 
when he committed the arson.  Marley, the underlying active 
tortfeasor, acted in a purely private capacity when he committed 
the arson.  It is well settled that an otherwise private tort is 
not committed under color of law simply because the tortfeasor is 
an employee of the state.  Rather, in order for the tortfeasor to 
be acting under color of state law, his act must entail "[m]isuse 
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 
  
law."  United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 
1031, 1043 (1941); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 
815-16 (3d Cir. 1994).  "[U]nder color of law means under 
'pretense' of law.  Thus, acts of officers in the ambit of their 
personal pursuits are plainly excluded.  Acts of officers who 
undertake to perform their official duties are included whether 
they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it."  Screws 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040 (1945) 
(plurality opinion).  See Barna, 42 F.3d at 815-16; Navarro v. 
Otero de Ramos, 797 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D.P.R. 1992).  But even 
"acts committed by a police officer . . . while on duty and in 
uniform are not under color of state law unless they are in some 
way 'related to the performance of police duties.'"  Briscoe v. 
LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 721 n.4. (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. 
Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)), aff'd, 460 U.S. 
325, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983).  As the Court of Appeals for the  
Second Circuit has explained, if a person's actions "were not 
'committed in the performance of any actual or pretended duty,'" 
the actions were not committed under color of law.  Bonsignore v. 
City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting 
Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. at 937).  See, generally, Barna 
42 F.3d at 815-17. 
 On this point, this case is not even close, unlike, for 
example, cases in which police officers moonlight as security 
guards and dress in their police uniforms.  See D.T. by M.T. v. 
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 
1990) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 
  
213 (1990).  Marley set a fire when his obligation was to put out 
fires.  He apparently did it secretly, giving no one the 
impression that he was acting on behalf of Enterprise.  While 
Mark contends that Marley lit the fire so that he could put it 
out, he points to no evidence in the record directly supporting 
that proposition.  Moreover, even if the allegation is true, it 
is not relevant in the circumstances here, as Mark does not 
contend that the officers or indeed anyone else from Enterprise 
knew that Marley intended to start the fire.  Marley clearly was 
pursuing his own goals and was not in any way subject to control 
by Enterprise when he started the fire.  Furthermore, it would be 
bizarre to hold that inasmuch as Enterprise was in the "business" 
of putting out fires, Marley furthered Enterprise's functions by 
providing it with an opportunity to fight a fire.  In this case 
the defendants did not abuse their authority and Marley was a 
private actor when he caused the harm.  Thus, DeShaney certainly 
applies, and the question becomes whether that case leaves open 
the possibility of state liability when private actors commit the 
underlying tort. 
 In this regard, it is important to recognize that in 
DeShaney, the "Court's baseline [was] the absence of positive 
rights in the Constitution and a concomitant suspicion of any 
claim that seems to depend on such rights."  DeShaney, 489 U.S. 
at 204, 109 S.Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  And when 
the Court characterized "the DeShaneys' claim [as being] first 
and foremost about inaction (the failure, here, of respondents to 
take steps to protect Joshua)," id. (Brennan, J., dissenting), 
  
the result became clear.  Thus, the proposition that "a State's 
failure to protect an individual against private violence simply 
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause," id. 
at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004, does not necessarily preclude 
liability where the harm -- though at the hands of a private 
actor -- is the product of state action that legitimately can be 
characterized as affirmative conduct.  Indeed, the DeShaney Court 
explicitly noted that under the facts of that case, "[w]hile the 
State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the 
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do 
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."  DeShaney, 
id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006.    
 Several courts have interpreted this language to mean 
that "[w]hen state actors knowingly place a person in danger, the 
due process clause of the constitution . . . render[s] them 
accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from their 
conduct".  Johnson v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 
199 (5th Cir. 1994); Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th 
Cir. 1982) ("If the state puts a man in a position of danger from 
private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be 
heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an 
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into the snake pit."). 
 For our part, we have yet to decide definitively 
whether the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for 
finding a constitutional injury.  In D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vo. Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc), 
cert. denied,     U.S.    , 113 S.Ct. 1045 (1993), while we 
  
analyzed the plaintiffs' claims under the state-created danger 
theory, we consistently referred to the claim as "plaintiffs' 
theory," only going so far as to acknowledge that other courts 
have recognized the theory.  See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1373 
("Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that this [state created danger] 
claim exists apart from the claim based on the compulsory 
attendance law."); id. at 1375 ("We now turn to the final two 
cases cited by plaintiffs to support their theory of state-
created danger.") (emphasis added).  Similarly, in Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1114-16 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2827 (1991), we acknowledged that other 
courts of appeals had applied the state created danger theory, 
but we simply distinguished those cases on the facts.  Finally, 
after noting in Searles v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth. 
plaintiff's argument that "the injury [was] directly caused by a 
state actor's affirmative act in the traditional sense," we 
quickly concluded that, even assuming the viability of the 
theory, the facts of the case did not fall within its purview.  
Searles, 990 F.2d at 793. 
  After undertaking a thorough review of our caselaw 
touching upon the underlying constitutional violation in a 
Monell/Collins case, we have found language in the cases 
supporting and opposing the existence of a state-created danger 
theory.  Perhaps at some point we will have to harmonize our 
cases.  But we have not reached that day, because even assuming 
that a plaintiff can state a constitutional violation based on 
  
the state-created danger theory, there can be no liability in 
this case. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently 
concluded that in order to prove liability under the state 
created danger theory, "the environment created by the state 
actors must be dangerous; they must know it to be dangerous; and 
. . . they must have used their authority to create an 
opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third 
party's crime to occur.  Put otherwise, the defendants must have 
been at least deliberately indifferent to the plight of the 
plaintiff."  Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d at 
201.12 
   Our review of the cases supports these observations.  
For instance, in Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 341 (1990), a state 
trooper, after arresting the driver of a car and impounding the 
car, left the driver's female passenger stranded alone in a 
neighborhood with the highest aggravated crime rate in the county 
at 2:30 A.M.  The plaintiff was raped.  The court held that the 
plaintiff "has raised a genuine issue of fact tending to show 
that [the trooper] acted with deliberate indifference to 
[plaintiff's] interest in personal security under the fourteenth 
amendment."  Id. at 588.  In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 
880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066, 110 
                     
12
.  In that case, the Court of Appeals declined to decide 
whether such a theory is viable. 
  
S.Ct. 1784 (1990), the state allowed a prisoner with a history of 
committing violent crimes to participate in a work release 
program where he had access to "axes, picks, machetes, knives and 
saws," and was supervised only by an unarmed civilian member of 
the community.  The inmate abducted the town clerk at knife point 
and held her hostage for three days, during which time he 
threatened to abuse her sexually and physically and to kill her.  
Id. at 350.   
 Cases like these have four things in common:  (1) the 
harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the 
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the 
plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship between the state 
and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority to 
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for 
the third party's crime to occur.  Thus, in Brown v. Grabowski we 
pointed out that in Wood, the plaintiff and state actors had 
"more than fleeting and merely prefatory . . . contact."  Brown, 
922 F.2d at 1116.  Similarly, Brown noted that "[i]n Cornelius, 
the plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendants who 
employed her exercised a control over her work environment that 
arguably was sufficient to create a special, quasi-custodial 
relationship between them."  Brown, 922 F.2d at 1115.  
Accordingly, in Brown we emphasized that cases applying the 
theory focused on the fact that a relationship existed between 
the state and the plaintiff, under which the state qua state 
placed the plaintiff in danger of a foreseeable injury.   
  
 The cases where the state-created danger theory was 
applied were based on discrete, grossly reckless acts committed 
by the state or state actors using their peculiar positions as  
state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to 
foreseeable injury.  In Wood, for example, the woman eventually 
was raped, and the court held that a jury could find that the 
officer, using his power as an officer, placed the plaintiff in a 
situation entailing a foreseeable risk of danger.  Indeed, 
assuming the facts are true, it would be unfair to say that the 
state actor was not responsible for the rape.   
 But this case is not like those cases at all.  When the 
alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at the public at large 
-- namely a failure to protect the public by failing adequately 
to screen applicants for membership in a volunteer fire company -
- the rationale behind the rule disappears -- there can be no 
specific knowledge by the defendant of the particular plaintiff's 
condition, and there is no relationship between the defendant and 
the plaintiff.  Therefore, we cannot say that an oppressive act 
of the defendants, made possible by virtue of the fact that they 
were acting in a public capacity, caused Mark's injury.13    
                     
13
.  Nor, for the reasons discussed above, and discussed below in 
our "deliberate indifference" section, can we say that 
Enterprise's and the Borough's actions in failing  
psychologically to screen applicants shocks the conscience and 
therefore that the policy itself caused the harm.  In this 
regard, we note that there is some inconsistency in our circuit 
as to the standard governing the underlying constitutional 
violation in policy, custom or practice cases.  Collins, in 
assessing whether the plaintiff had established a constitutional 
violation predicate to municipal liability, asked first whether 
she had established a duty, and second whether the defendant's 
actions shocked the conscience.  In Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 
  
 We conclude, therefore, that Mark has failed to 
demonstrate that he was deprived of a constitutional right.  
Consequently, neither Enterprise nor the Borough can be liable in 
this case.   
 
 C.  Were defendants deliberately indifferent? 
(..continued) 
F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc), we interpreted Collins to 
mean that in all substantive due process cases, the appropriate 
constitutional test is whether the defendant's actions shock the 
conscience.  But in Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (panel opinion), in articulating the constitutional 
standard for municipal liability, we said: 
 
 [I]n a substantive due process case arising 
out of a police pursuit, an underlying 
constitutional tort can still exist even if 
no individual police officer violated the 
Constitution. . . . The pursuing police 
officers are liable under section 1983 if 
their conduct 'shocks the conscience.'  The 
City is liable under section 1983 if its 
policymakers, acting with deliberate 
indifference, implemented a policy of 
inadequate training and thereby caused the 
officers to conduct the pursuit in an unsafe 
manner and deprive the plaintiffs of life or 
liberty. 
 
Id. at 1292 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Therefore, the  
Fagan panel opinion appeared to hold that a plaintiff can 
establish a constitutional violation predicate to a claim of 
municipal liability simply by demonstrating that the 
policymakers, acting with deliberate indifference, enacted an 
inadequate policy that caused an injury.  It appears that, by 
focusing almost exclusively on the "deliberate indifference" 
prong of the Collins test, the panel opinion did not apply the 
first prong -- establishing an underlying constitutional 
violation.  At any rate, as discussed in detail in the text, we 
believe that the defendants' actions and omissions not only fail 
to shock the conscience, but cannot be characterized as 
deliberately indifferent. 
  
 Notwithstanding our foregoing conclusion, we will 
assume that Mark was deprived of a constitutional right.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that the defendants cannot be 
responsible for his losses even though Mark asserts that they 
were deliberately indifferent in failing to establish and impose 
prudent membership screening requirements.  In City of Canton v. 
Harris, the Court discussed the meaning of the deliberate 
indifference standard: 
 It may seem contrary to common sense to 
assert that a municipality will actually have 
a policy of not taking reasonable steps to 
train its employees.  But it may happen that 
in light of the duties assigned to specific 
officers or employees the need for more or 
different training is so obvious, and the 
inadequacy so likely to result in the 
violation of constitutional rights, that the 
policymakers of the city can reasonably be 
said to have been deliberately indifferent to 
the need.  In that event, the failure to 
provide proper training may fairly be said to 
represent a policy for which the city is 
responsible, and for which the city may be 
held liable if it actually causes injury. 
 
489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. at 1205.  As an example, the Court 
noted that it may be obvious that when the city has armed its 
police officers with firearms, and the city knows the officers 
will be required to arrest fleeing felons, "the need to train 
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly 
force can be said to be 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could 
properly be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to 
constitutional rights."  Id. at n.10. 
  
 Mark's evidence that the defendants' failure to screen 
applicants psychologically for tendencies toward arson amounts to 
deliberate indifference consists of the following:  Joseph 
Reading of Enterprise and others representing Enterprise and the 
Borough, testified that arsonists pose a greater danger to the 
community when members of fire departments, see app. 417, and 
that in recent years there have been a number of instances in 
which volunteer firemen, though not members of Enterprise, set 
fires.  App. 447.  Mark also includes a series of expert reports 
tending to show that Marley exhibited a "thrill seeking" 
personality and a history of alcohol and drug abuse and that 
therefore he should not have been made a member of the fire 
department.  According to Mark's evidence, Marley appeared 
visibly drunk at fires.  Third, Mark has attached a series of 
newspaper articles demonstrating the risk of volunteer 
firefighters committing fires.  Finally, Mark submitted a report 
from George E. Friedell, Deputy Chief (Retired) of the New York 
City Fire Department and Assistant Professor of Fire Science at 
City University of New York, stating that "physical and mental 
capabilities of applicants and members should be tested at levels 
commensurate with the duties of a fire fighter."  App. 993.  The 
report points out that "[i]t is well known that certain arsonists 
set fires either for the thrill of watching the fire or the 
thrill of participating in extinguishing the fire."  Id.  
Moreover, "[i]t is well known that virtually all professional and 
many volunteer fire companies have adopted a policy of doing 
psychological testing and background investigation of applicants 
  
and of members suspected of having problems and that, where such 
testing is performed, arson fires by fire fighters have been 
reduced essentially to zero."  Id. at 995. 
 But the report provides no statistical evidence that 
psychological testing substantially has reduced such arsons. 
Consequently, we are asked to take Friedell's word for it.  In 
any event, even if we do so, Enterprise did have a screening 
procedure -- the state police performed a background check on 
each applicant at Enterprise's expense.  And, prior to the Marley 
fire, Enterprise's firefighters had not committed a single arson 
in the past 100 years.14  Thus, any allegation that the need for 
psychological screening was "obvious" would have to measure the 
extent to which psychological screening provides a better 
benchmark for discovering potential arsonists than the police 
background check Enterprise already employed.  We cannot say on 
the record before us that psychological testing provides such a 
better method of screening that a failure to use it can be held 
to evince deliberate indifference to members of the community. 
                     
14
.  While a "policy which ordered or authorized an 
unconstitutional act can be established by a single decision by 
proper municipal policymakers", see Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300 n.11 
(1986), the fact that only a single unconstitutional act is 
alleged can support a conclusion that the act was not caused by a 
policy, see id. (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24, 105 S.Ct. at 
2436), or that the need for heightened training or screening was 
not obvious.  City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. at 
1205 n.10 ("It could also be that the police, in exercising their 
discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need 
for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city 
policymakers, who, nevertheless, are 'deliberately indifferent' 
to the need."). 
  
 In reaching our conclusions, we accept the proposition 
that psychological screening would tell more about a person's 
background than a state police background check -- including 
characteristics that are compatible with the characteristics of 
arsonists.  Yet such screening in itself can lead to difficulties 
as it may exclude too many people and perhaps be constitutionally 
deficient in that way.  Thus, if we held that Mark could survive 
the motions for summary judgment because at trial the trier of 
the fact might conclude that there should have been psychological 
screening, we effectively might be requiring volunteer fire 
companies to initiate a process which in other cases will expose 
it to liability by reason of having excluded an applicant from 
membership.  In this regard, we point out that we have held that 
Enterprise is a public actor. 
 Moreover, an overbroad screening process, even if not 
leading to lawsuits by excluding applicants, could infringe on 
their privacy rights.  In fact, Reading testified that Enterprise 
stopped having a background check performed by local police 
because "the right to privacy came in . . . ."  App. 412.  Cf. 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. at 1007 ("In defense of [the 
county workers] it must also be said that had they moved too soon 
to take custody of the son away from the father, they would 
likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into 
the parent-child relationship.").  The totality of these 
circumstances establishes that the record cannot support a 
conclusion that Enterprise was deliberately indifferent with 
  
respect to screening applicants.  The most that can be said is 
that in some persons' views there was a better way to screen.15 
 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) Enterprise 
is a state actor; (2) there was no underlying constitutional 
violation in this case for which the defendants can be held 
responsible; (3) even if liability could attach, it may not be 
imposed in this case because the defendants did not enact a 
policy evincing willful disregard or deliberate indifference to 
plaintiff's rights.  Therefore, for all the reasons detailed 
above, we will affirm the order for summary judgment of June 30, 
1994. 
                     
15
.  We hasten to add that we are not holding that screening is 
necessary, as that issue is not before us since Enterprise did 
screen applicants. 
Mark v. Hatboro, No. 94-1722 
Greenberg, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I write separately in this case because I believe 
Edmonson should be read to alter the interpretive landscape for 
all state action inquiries into whether a private actor should be 
considered a state actor for a particular action or course of 
conduct.  I believe that the discrete test approach did not 
survive Edmonson. 
 I. 
 As the majority opinion notes, the Edmonson Court 
described the state action doctrine as follows: 
 Our precedents establish that, in determining 
whether a particular action or course of 
conduct is governmental in character, it is 
relevant to examine the following:  the 
extent to which the actor relies on 
governmental assistance and benefits, see 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. 
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988); 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 
U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961); whether the 
actor is performing a traditional 
governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953); Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946); 
cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 
522, 544-45, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (1987); 
and whether the injury caused is aggravated 
in a unique way by the incidents of 
governmental authority, see Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). 
 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22, 111 
S.Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).  Yet the majority concludes that this 
language applies only to one of the discrete state action 
inquiries, and assumes that the entire panoply of discrete tests 
  
survived Edmonson.  I recognize that a number of courts have, 
like the district court and majority opinion in this case, 
continued to apply the discrete test approach.  See, e.g., United 
Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 906 (4th 
Cir. 1995); Sherman v. Community Consolidated Sch. Dist., 8 F.3d 
1160, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1993); Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 
6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993); Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 
F.2d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 
S.Ct. 79 (1993); Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F. Supp. 
1531, 1540 (D. Wyo. 1993).  And because prior precedents of this 
Court similarly have ruled, I wrote the majority opinion that 
way.  Groman v. Township of Manalapan, No. 94-5200 (3d Cir. Feb. 
16, 1995). 
 But I believe that interpretation is wrong.  In the 
first place, as the Supreme Court itself has pointed out, it 
never has been clear "[w]hether these different tests are 
actually different in operation or simply different ways of 
characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts 
the Court in [each] situation".  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755 (1982).  Thus, to say that 
there are no discrete tests is not saying anything new or 
radical.  And, as is apparent by the description and application 
of the various scenarios in the majority opinion, utilization of 
the discrete test approach has created nothing short of an 
analytical muddle.  For one thing, the discrete tests collapse 
  
into each other and overlap significantly.  See 2 Ronald D. 
Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 16.4 at 
554-55 (2d ed. 1992).  Moreover, "[u]nfortunately, [the Supreme 
Court] cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of 
the state have not been a model of consistency."  Edmonson, 500 
U.S. at 632, 111 S.Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) and 
therefore it is unclear when and whether to apply particular 
tests.  See also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 
S.Ct. 961, 964 (1995) (quoting Justice O'Connor).  Further still, 
what is the use of having a strict "exclusive government function 
test" if an action otherwise deemed private under that test can 
become public under the "symbiotic relationship" test.  Finally, 
the discrete test approach forced courts into pursuits of the 
viability of one or another test, rather than into an inquiry of 
whether under the facts of a particular case, there had been 
"state action."  See, e.g., Majority Typescript at 14 n.6 
(discussing question of whether symbiotic relationship test 
remains viable). 
 In my view, Edmonson provided a way out of the muddle, 
and we should take it.  Rather than stating a series of discrete 
tests and applying them separately to determine whether each by 
itself is satisfied, the Court considered a number of factors, 
and weighed them to determine whether, all things considered, the 
otherwise private actor fairly could be deemed to be a state 
actor.  Under that new framework, courts should consider the 
  
principles furthered by the previous tests as part of a single 
balancing and weighing approach.  And it should apply to all 
cases involving the question of whether a private actor is 
engaged in state action. 
 The state action confusion certainly stemmed in part 
from the fact that the Court created what appeared to be discrete 
tests but then utilized them to address particular factual 
scenarios.  See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 
722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860 (1961) (courts must determine whether 
there is state action by "sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances").  Thus, the courts applied the different 
formulations on an ad-hoc basis to determine whether a party is 
attempting to hold the state or entity liable based on private 
actions "for which they cannot fairly be blamed."  Lugar, 457 
U.S. at 936-37, 102 S.Ct. at 2753.  I believe the Edmonson 
language takes us full circle back to those principles and 
provides us a way out of the muddle by mandating that we apply a 
different -- and better and more flexible -- framework than the 
prior cases.   
  
 II. 
 Edmonson's discussion of the public function test 
further supports my conclusion that it set forth a new framework 
for deciding state-action issues.  As noted above, prior to 
Edmonson, in order to constitute state action under the public 
  
function test, the action had to be traditionally within the 
exclusive prerogative of the state.  But in Edmonson, the Court 
inquired only whether "the action in question involves the 
performance of a traditional function of the government."  
Edmonson, id. at 624, 111 S.Ct. at 2085.  It appears that the 
Court intentionally deleted the exclusivity requirement for 
Justice O'Connor's dissent suggested that the majority had 
"misstated the law" by holding that "state action may be imputed 
to one who carries out a 'traditional governmental function.'"  
Id. at 639, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent continued:  "In order to constitute state action under 
[the public function] doctrine, private conduct must not only 
comprise something that the government traditionally does, but 
something that only the government traditionally does."  Id. at 
640, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). In other words, 
Edmonson seems consciously to have eliminated the "exclusivity" 
requirement from the public function inquiry.16  See also 
McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Ed., 24 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in 
                     
16
.  Judge Sarokin concurs that in Edmonson the Supreme Court 
deleted the "exclusivity" requirement from the public function 
inquiry.  He concludes, however, in accordance with this 
concurring opinion that we are bound by the contrary holdings in 
Black, McKeesport, and Groman.  See concurring opinion typescript 
at 2. 
  
judgment) ("Edmonson . . . seemed to eliminate the 'exclusivity' 
requirement of the public function test for state action.").17 
                     
17
.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in analyzing 
the effect of Edmonson, held that "exclusivity" still is part of 
the public function test.  It reasoned as follows: 
 
 [W]e do not believe the Supreme Court would 
have attempted to change radically the 
government function standard set forth in 
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, and thereafter 
applied consistently in Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 
at 157-58, Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005, 1011-12 
(1982), [San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. 
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
544-45 (1987)], and NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 197-98 n.18 (1988), through the 
transparent puerilism of simple omission.  If 
it had intended to change the law in this 
respect, we believe it would have said so 
explicitly.  Moreover, the ultimate reasoning 
of the Court in Edmonson was that juror 
selection was traditionally an exclusive 
governmental function.  See, e.g., Edmonson, 
500 U.S. at 627 ("The selection of jurors 
represents a unique governmental function 
delegated to private litigants by the 
government and attributable to the government 
. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
 
United Auto Workers, 43 F.3d at 906 n.2.  While the United Auto 
Workers court's point is well taken, its rationale is based on a 
premise I reject -- that the public function test necessarily 
remains, in and of itself, a method of imposing state actor 
status.  As discussed in the text, infra, I agree that the 
Supreme Court would not simultaneously have retained the public 
function test yet deleted the exclusivity requirement.  That 
would be a breathtaking expansion of the state action doctrine.  
But it does make sense to delete the "exclusivity" requirement 
and use the public function concept as part of a broader state 
action inquiry.  Thus, in my reading of Edmonson, it does not 
constitute such a radical change in the law that an explicit 
statement that "we abandon the exclusivity requirement" is 
required.  After all, other than exclusivity, all the other 
  
 But, if Justice O'Connor's conclusion was correct -- 
that under the majority's analysis state action could be found 
simply from the fact that the challenged action occurred within a 
"traditional government function," the Court would have widened 
significantly the category of "public functions."  After all, 
"many functions have been traditionally performed by 
governments."  Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158, 98 
S.Ct. 1729, 1734 (1978).  Yet, if the three-test approach, under 
which satisfaction of one of the discrete tests is enough, is the 
only approach after Edmonson, then the Court in Edmonson would in 
fact have expanded greatly the circumstances in which there had 
been state action and the possibility of section 1983 liability.  
I doubt that the Court intended that result and thus Edmonson is 
best understood if it is recognized that an inquiry into whether 
a private party performs a public function merely is one 
important factor to consider in determining whether state action 
exists.18 
(..continued) 
components of the public function test delineated in the prior 
caselaw, such as that "receipt of public funds and the 
performance of a function serving the public alone are not enough 
to make a private entity a state actor," see Groman v. Township 
of Manalapan, No. 94-5200, slip op. at 21 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 
1995), remain part of the test. 
18
.  It is true, as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
recently pointed out, that in Edmonson, the Supreme Court 
described jury selection as a unique governmental function.  
United Auto Workers, 43 F.3d at 906 n.2.  But if "unique" is to 
be equated with "exclusive" under the discrete test approach, the 
Court could have stopped at that point.  It did not; rather, the 
Court went on to consider other factors as well. 
  
 In my reading, then, the three tests no longer (if they 
ever did) constitute discrete, dispositive tests to the exclusion 
of a broader approach.  Instead, a court should consider the 
principles embodied in those tests in determining whether it is 
fair to find state action in a particular case.  Thus, the fact 
that the action constituted a traditional governmental function, 
while certainly relevant, does not in itself necessarily mean 
there has been state action.  Rather, a court generally should go 
on to consider other relevant factors. 
